

SO.5 IS ALIVE AND WELL

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It is pleasant to find that the problem of interpreting SO.5 provokes such interest. Malcolm Rennie tries to shew in [1] that my argument in [2] proves too much. He is right to this extent; that some of the things I say on p. 377 do claim more than I had intended. I do indeed give the impression that it is always an open question whether a proposition of the form Lp can also have the form $q \supset q$. But of course I can't possibly mean to claim this for *whatever* L means. E.g. if L means 'it is contingently true that', then no proposition of the form Lp could also have the form $q \supset q$. More to the point if L means 'it is a law of thought that', then too the supposition is, as Rennie shews, implausible. But in SO.5 L means none of these things. It means 'it is a tautology that' and Rennie has not shewn that with *that* meaning it is implausible to claim that some propositions might be both of the form Lp and of the form $q \supset q$.

Rennie also claims that my principle is false in S5, but I must admit I can't follow his argument here. In S5 there are propositions which have both the form Lp and $q \supset q$; e.g. $L(p \supset p)$ and $(q \supset q)$ in the standard S5 modelling are assigned the same set of worlds and so can be regarded as expressing the same proposition.

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REFERENCES

- [1] M. K. RENNIE, Remark on Cresswell on SO.5, *Logique et Analyse* N° 56 (1971) pp. 757-758.
- [2] M. J. CRESSWELL, Note on the interpretation of SO.5, *Logique et Analyse*, N° 51 (1970) pp. 376-378.