

VREDENDUIN'S SYSTEM OF STRICT IMPLICATION

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Vredenduin claims ([3], p. 76) that his system **N** of strict implication 'is in conformity with real deducibility' whereas the system **S2** of Lewis and Langford is not. But, as will be shown, the essential part of Vredenduin's system **N** coincides with **S2**; and therefore, since **N** contains **S2**, **N** is just as paradoxical as **S2**.

N is got by dropping Lewis's definition, $A \rightarrow B =_{\text{df}} \sim \Diamond(A \& \sim B)$, of strict implication, and taking ' \rightarrow ', as well as ' \sim ', ' $\&$ ' and ' \Diamond ', as a primitive connective; by taking over intact Lewis & Langford's postulates ([1], pp. 124-126, p. 166) for **S2**; and by supplementing these postulates by the following axioms:

13. $\sim p \rightarrow q \rightarrow \sim q \rightarrow p$
14. $p \& q \rightarrow r \rightarrow p \& \sim r \rightarrow \sim q$
15. $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow p \& r \rightarrow q \& r$
16. $p \rightarrow q \& r \rightarrow s \rightarrow p \& r \rightarrow q \& s$
17. $p \rightarrow \Diamond p$
18. $p \rightarrow q \& \Diamond p \rightarrow \Diamond q$
19. $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow \sim \Diamond(p \& \sim q)$.

The axiomatisation in fact contains redundancies, e.g. 16. is derivable using 15.; and it could also be shortened by minor modifications of axioms, e.g. Lewis's axiom $p \& q \rightarrow q \& p$ is readily derived from a permuted form of 15.

Theorem 1. **N** contains **S2**.

Proof: The possibility connective 'M', of **S2**, can be defined, as usual:

$$MA =_{\text{df}} \sim(A \rightarrow \sim A).$$

It remains to show that M has the correct properties; and for this it suffices to prove:

- (1) $p \rightarrow q \rightarrow . \sim M(p \& \sim q)$
 (2) $\sim M(p \& \sim q) \rightarrow . p \rightarrow q$
 (3) $M(p \& q) \rightarrow M p$

For (1) and (2) together provide Lewis's definition of strict implication, and (3) gives the only postulate of **S2** that **N** does not provide.

ad (1): It is enough to prove:

$$p \rightarrow q \rightarrow . p \& \sim q \rightarrow . \sim (p \& \sim q).$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Now } p \rightarrow q \rightarrow . \sim q \rightarrow \sim p & \\ \rightarrow . \sim q \& \sim q \rightarrow \sim p & \text{by Substitutivity} \\ \rightarrow . p \& \sim q \rightarrow q & \text{by Antilogism} \\ \rightarrow . p \& (p \& \sim q) \rightarrow q & \text{by Substitutivity} \\ \rightarrow . p \& \sim q \rightarrow \sim (p \& q) & \text{by Antilogism} \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{ad (2): } p \& \sim q \rightarrow \sim (p \& \sim q) \rightarrow . p \& (p \& \sim q) \rightarrow q & \\ & \text{by Antilogism} & \\ & \rightarrow . p \& \sim q \rightarrow q & \\ & \rightarrow . \sim q \& \sim q \rightarrow \sim p & \\ & \rightarrow . \sim q \rightarrow \sim p & \\ & \rightarrow . p \rightarrow q & \end{array}$$

ad (3): Proof uses the principle: $p \rightarrow q \& r \rightarrow . p \rightarrow q$ ([1], 19.62 and, as a T-principle, 16.5; these principles are conceded by Vredenduin [3], footnote 8).

Then,

$$\begin{array}{ll} p \rightarrow \sim p \rightarrow . p \& q \rightarrow \sim p \& q & \text{by Factor} \\ \rightarrow . p \& q \rightarrow \sim p & \\ \rightarrow . q \& (p \& q) \rightarrow \sim p & \\ \rightarrow . p \& q \rightarrow \sim (p \& \sim q) & \text{by Antilogism} \end{array}$$

Hence $\sim M p \rightarrow \sim M(p \& q)$.

N thus amounts to **S2**, formulated with connective set $\{\sim, \&, \rightarrow\}$ supplemented by an additional modal functor ' \diamond '.

Hence every paradox of **S2** reappears in **N**; only the notation is changed so that $\sim \diamond p \rightarrow . p \rightarrow q$ of **S2** reappears as $\sim Mp \rightarrow . p \rightarrow q$ in **N**.

Nor does **N** outrun **S2**. Call the subsystem of **N** with all wff and theorems of **N**, formulated just using connective set $\{\sim, \&, \rightarrow\}$, system **V**.

Then:

Theorem 2. $\vdash_{S2} A$ iff $\vdash_V A$.

Proof: It follows from theorem 1 that if $\vdash_{S2} A$ then $\vdash_V A$. For the converse, define an **N**-structure $\mathcal{N} = \langle G, K, N, R, S, v \rangle$, where $\langle G, K, N, R, v \rangle$, is an **S2**-model (as defined in [2]) and S is a further relation on K , such that S is reflexive and $S \subseteq R$, i.e. for every $H_1, H_2 \in K$, $H_1 S H_2 \supset H_1 R H_2$. The valuation function v is extended in the usual **S2** way for connectives of **V**; and for the connective ' \diamond ', for H such that $G R H$, $v(\diamond A, H) = T$ iff $(SH_1) (HSH_1 \& v(A, H_1) = T) \vee H \notin N$; and for other H , $v(\diamond A, H)$ is assigned arbitrarily (or as part of the model). Then

(a) Every theorem of **N** is true in every **N**-structure.

But, since in assessing a wff of **V**, relation S is never used, the separability result

(b) Every theorem of **V** is true in every **S2**-model, follows. Hence since **S2** is complete with respect to **S2**-models (see [2]), every theorem of **V** is a theorem of **S2**.

Finally, the **N**-modelling shows that the further modal connective ' \diamond ', added to **V** to yield **N**, is of less than **S2** strength, since it does not guarantee unlimited substitutivity of strict equivalence.

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REFERENCES

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